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7I.  Introduction
The theory of the firm − or broader, of economic organization − is without much doubt one
of the most important and rapidly growing subject areas in contemporary economics.  It has
attracted the foremost symbol manipulators of the mainstream and has also drawn
considerable attention from economists of more heterodox stripes.   Moreover, and
appropriately in the present context, it has for a long time been one of Brian Loasby’s
favorite subjects.
The basic features of the emergence of the theory of the firm in its modern sense1 are well-
known: after a long neglect, Ronald Coase’s (1937) seminal contribution was re-discovered
and his analysis was given a new lease on life in the beginning of the 1970s by Oliver
Williamson (1975) and Alchian and Demsetz (1972), two contributions that are often seen as
founding different streams of Coasean thought on the firm (e.g., Alchian and Woodward
1988).  To this standard view of the modern history of the theory of the firm should,
however, be added important breakthroughs in formal mainstream economics, such as work
on mechanism design and, almost simultaneously, the first spate of work on the principal-
agent problem (Wilson, Spence, Zeckhauser,  Groves), followed by various extensions of the
principal-agent model by Mirrlees, Holmström, Grossman and Hart and others, and leading,
somewhat indirectly, to what is sometimes called “the property rights” or “the incomplete
contract framework” (Grossman and Hart 1986; Hart 1995).
Formal mainstream work on contracts and organization is seldom mentioned in accounts of
the modern history of the theory of the firm (such as Alchian and Woodward 1988), which
tend to be written by non-formal economists.  However, at least in economics (management
studies is another matter), it is the modern outgrowth of these earlier formal influences that
are seen as constituting the theoretical avantgarde − not really the more verbal work
associated with such writers as Williamson, Alchian and Demsetz and others.2  This is not to
claim that modern formal work has done significantly much more than to cast earlier
                                               
1
   Meaning a theory of the existence, boundaries and internal organization of the firm.
2
  Moreover, it tends to be this sort of work that goes into the textbooks; see, for example, Milgrom and
Roberts (1992).
8“intuition” in formal garb3; but to the mainstream economist, this sort of heuristic progress is
virtually identical to scientific progress.  If one wants to reach mainstream economists, it is
often necessary to relate to the latest instances of heuristic progress within the mainstream.
I shall be concerned in this paper with a subject area that has been among the hotter ones
recently − for example, it has been the subject of recent Clarendon Lectures (Hart 1995) and
Walras-Bowley Lectures (Tirole 1994) −, namely incomplete contracts.  Incomplete
contracts are ex ante contracts that do not embody contingencies that fully informed agents
with perfect foresight who did not face contracting costs would have included in the
contracts.  How and why incomplete contracts matter to economic organization is a theme
that has been increasingly refined in a relatively recent and highly formal literature that
perhaps in many ways owes more to the early formal influences mentioned above than to the
work of less formal theorists such as Williamson or Alchian and Demsetz.
I do not mean to imply here that the theme of incomplete contracts is a completely recent
one.  On the contrary, Brian Loasby has for more than two decades emphasized the
importance of incomplete contracts and deserves credit as being one of the first economists
to consistently do so.  For example, in Choice, Complexity, and Ignorance (1976)
(henceforth, CCI), the discussion again and again centers on “[t]he imperfectly-specified
contract which characterizes the firm” (p.135), and contractual incompleteness is
imaginatively tied to questions relating to bounded rationality, genuine uncertainty, flexibility,
etc.  As Loasby makes clear, such questions
“... cannot even be posed in the language of general equilibrium theory; for such
theory not only requires all problems to be properly defined, but requires them all
to be specified at the outset.  There is no place for the unexpected.  But these are
precisely the questions which arise naturally from the analysis of the firm ... The
firm exists because it is impossible to specify all actions, even contingent actions in
advance; it embodies a very different policy to emergent events. Incomplete
specification is its essential basis: for complete specification can be handled by the
market” (1976, p.134).
                                               
3
  In fact, it may not even have done this, as David Kreps (1996, p.562) indicates, referring to Williamson
(1975): “If Markets and Hierarchies has been translated into game theory using notions from information
economics, it is a very poor translation”.
9These and other similar observations place Loasby among Coase, Simon and Williamson,
that is, the first economists to emphasize the connections between bounded rationality/limited
foresight, contractual incompleteness, and the rationale of the firm.
However, while Coase, Simon and Williamson are acknowledged to have laid the
groundwork for modern work on incomplete contracts, Loasby is not, and for a very good
reason: he has entertained a distinctly non-orthodox perspective on contractual
incompleteness.  I plan in this paper to discuss Loasby’s view and to contrast it with other
views, specifically modern formal work on contracts, particularly that represented by “the
property rights” or “the incomplete contracting framework” (Grossman and Hart 1986; Hart
and Moore 1990; Hart 1995).4  Loasby is in overall agreement with this literature on the
importance of incomplete contracts to the understanding of conomic organization, but on
closer inspection the differences are rather fundamental.  To put it briefly (and somewhat
simplistically), whereas Loasby is concerned with the organization of knowledge, the modern
economics of organization (including the incomplete contracts literature) is concerned with
the organization of incentives and property rights.
In the incomplete contracts view, the importance of incompleteness for economic
organization derives from the circumstance that it allows for the possibility of hold-ups that
may cause inefficient levels of investment in relation-specific assets.  This has resulted in a
clear and formal (if somewhat ad hoc) theory of, among other things, the boundaries of firms,
these being defined in terms of ownership rights to physical assets.   Loasby’s view does not
utilize the analytical machinery employed by formal economists, and transmits a rather
different message: In his view the importance of incompleteness is related, not to incentive
conflicts, but to the building of capabilities through organizational learning.  Because of its
inherent flexibility, a structure of incomplete contracts allows for this to take place which
more complete contract would not.  Thus, we can imagine rational, forward-looking agents
choosing governance structures of various sorts, not necessarily because these are the ones
that best protect knowledge-based rents against opportunistic proclivities, that is, reduce
                                                                                                                                               
4
 A literature upon which Loasby himself has commented, namely in his 1995 review of Milgrom and
Roberts (1992).  Of course, there are also many discussions in Loasby’s work of Williamson whose work in
some respects is closely related to, and in fact has partly inspired, the work of the incomplete contract
theorists.
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transaction costs, but because they are expected to generate higher knowledge-based benefits
than other governance structures.
The design of the paper is the following.  I begin by providing a brief overview and
discussion of the modern economics of organization, concentrating in particular on the work
of incomplete contract theorists.  I then turn to a discussion of Loasby’s view of the firm and
incomplete contracts.  The point here is that while Loasby begins from the same recognition
as modern incomplete theorists, that contractual incompleteness is a necessary component of
a theory of the firm, the causes and consequences of contractual incompleteness are widely
different.  I end by speculating on how Loasby’s non-mainstream ideas on economic
organization may be related to some relatively mainstream ideas about alternative gameforms
and real options.
II.   Organizing Incentives and Property Rights:
The Modern Economics of Organization
A. From Agency Theory to Incomplete Contracts Theory
Although modern formal theories of organization are partial equilibrium theories, and
although they emphasize bilateral aspects of transactions, they have a foundation in general
equilibrium theory, both historically and conceptually (Hart and Holmström 1987; Milgrom
and Roberts 1992; Guesnerie 1994).  In a sense, the Arrow-Debreu model is a contractual
model with the specific property that it demonstrates the conditions that must obtain for all
problems of organization to be trivial (in the sense that ownership is of no consequence).
The recognition in the 1960s that all Arrow-Debreu states of nature may not be observable
(rather, verifiable) formed the basis for work on moral hazard, and the situation in which
states of nature are known to agents, but not to the auctioneer, formed the basis for work on
adverse selection.  Much formal work in the last two decades has consisted of incorporating
these ideas in general equilibrium models in a consistent way, and of examining their welfare
and policy implications (see the overview in Guesnerie 1994).
In the same period of time, ideas built on this work, and normally marketed as “the
principal/agent paradigm”, has increasingly gained momentum as a strong economic
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approach to organization (see the non-technical accounts in Miller 1992 and Milgrom and
Roberts 1992. Although the principal/agent literature has provided many valuable insights
into, for example, internal organization and the rationales of specific contract provisions, it
fails, however, as an explanation of the existence and boundaries of the firm.
First, many relationships within the firm (or even between firms and owners) are not directly
determined by formal contracts but by the parties’ expectations of each others roles and
behavior.  This leads to the idea of implicit contracts, and in turn to the idea of incomplete
contracts, in which many contingencies are not explicitly covered by the contract.  Second,
the principal-agent paradigm fails to discriminate between alternative types of economic
organization: from a principal-agent perspective, a contract between an employer and an
employee may be completely the same as a contract between a firm and a supplier, although
legal matters differ and although different ownership arrangements are evidently involved.  In
other words, the principal-agent analysis carries no implications for ownership.5
Fundamentally, the inability of the principal/agent literature to really come to grips with
ownership, and, therefore (according to incomplete contract theorists), with the issue of the
boundaries of the firm, must be ascribed to the assumption that contracts are comprehensive
in the sense that contracts specify all parties’ obligations in all future states of the world.
Ownership only has a role when contracts can be incomplete in the sense that there are
contingencies on which ex ante efficient contracting would turn that do not turn up in the ex
ante contract.
As recent research has clarified, of the early research on the economics of the firm, it was the
stream associated with Williamson (1975) and with Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978),
with its emphasis on specific assets and incomplete contracts, that held the key to explaining
the existence and, particularly, the boundaries of the firm.6  In a historical, this recent
research − here generically called “the incomplete contracts literature” − may be seen as an
outgrowth of principal-agent theory and related formal work on contracts, applied to the
insights of Williamson and Klein, Crawford and Alchian.  Their basic ideas, particularly the
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 The same goes for the (largely non-formal) research tradition, often called “the nexus of contracts” theory,
founded by Alchian and Demsetz (1972), and close in spirit to the principal/agent literature.
6
  Rather than the informal nexus of contracts view started by Alchian and Demsetz (1972) or formal work on
the principal-agent problem.
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paradigmatic “hold-up situation”, are now understood in the following way.   One begins
with the idea that many contracts are incomplete. In the literature, it is recognized that
contracts may be incomplete for the following reasons: 1) the limitations of natural language;
2) the parties inadvertently failed to contract about an issue; 3) information processing
costs/bounded rationality, which may make it rational to leave out certain
issues/contingencies; and 4) asymmetric information, which may make some issues non-
verifiable (rather, very costly to verify to a jury/court) or cause problems when the
information remains private ex post.
Since complete contingent contracts cannot be written, parties to a contract may find it
necessary to renegotiate their contracts after the contract has been signed, either because
they encounter states of nature about which the contract is silent or where the contract
specifies inefficient terms.  It is assumed, however, that the outcome of the renegotiation
process can be foreseen at the time of drafting contracts and that the process does not
involve costly bargaining (hence, is efficient).  Nevertheless, the very fact of the possibility of
renegotiation may be sufficient to cause inefficient levels of investment in relation-specific
assets.
Consider a bare bones version of the Grossman-Hart-Moore model (Grossman and Hart
1986; Hart and Moore 1990; Hart 1995).  Here a buyer and a seller find it impossible to
provide, in advance, an exact description of the goods they wish to trade (one may perhaps
think of an innovation project), and because of this, it is claimed, there is no point in writing
a contract. The terms of trade will therefore have to be determined when the nature of the
exchanged goods can be ascertained.  Call the gains from trade (“the surplus”) v (X), where
X is a non-contractible7 and specific investment that the seller has to undertake at a private
cost of c (X) in order to be able to sell to the buyer and which must therefore be undertaken
before trade.  v will be split 50 : 50.  v as well as the splitting rule can be perfectly foreseen.
In choosing his level of investment, the seller will equate his marginal cost, c’ (X), to his
marginal benefit, ½ v’ (X).  Thus, for every extra unit of increase in social benefit, only 50
percent of this goes to the seller.  This is seen in the literature as a sort of representation of
                                               
7
 Because the investment is unverifiable.  In the literature, “effort” and “investment” are conflated, because
both are taken to be unverifiable.
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the basic hold-up problem8: the buyer may be argued to hold up the seller ex post by
appropriating half of the (marginal) surplus.  Of course, if a complete long-term contract had
been written, there would no hold-up problem, since then the seller could have reaped not ½
v’ (X), but v’ (X), and his incentives would be consistent with the maximization of the social
surplus.  But since this is impossible, something else must substitute.  This “something” are
ownership rights, or more precisely residual control rights, that is, the rights to control (make
“implementation decisions”) the use of assets in states of nature that are not described in the
contract.  The interest then centers on which pattern of ownership rights lead to the most
efficient outcome.
In the Grossman and Hart (1986) analysis, parties to a contract can each make two decisions,
first, a decision on investment levels, and, second, an “implementation” decision, which is
taken after the investment decision and which can be transferred to the other party.  To
repeat, the latter type of decision concerns the right to determine the use of physical assets in
states of nature that are not covered by the contract (residual decision rights).  These rights
matter because they are sources of power in situations where contracts are incomplete.  For
example, in a situation where a firm confronts an unexpected rise in the demand for its
product, it may want its supplier to undertake an increase in supply, which, in turn, is
unexpected to the supplier and not covered by the contract between the two firms.  If the
firms are separately owned, the owners/management of the supplier firm may threaten to
make both the firms assets and their own labor unavailable for the uncontracted-for supply
increase, whereas if the supplier is a division in the buying firm, it cannot threaten to make
the assets unavailable.  Because of these differences in ownership-induced bargaining power,
the division of the surplus may be quite different in the two cases, which, in turn, feeds back
into investment. Which ownership arrangements (should the supplier own the buying firm or
vice versa or should they be independent?) will be efficient depends, for example, on the
degree of complementarity between assets, so that “strictly complementary” assets should
lead to integration.9  It may also depend on whose assets are most important to the joint
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  Although surely not one that captures the many subleties of the analysis of Klein, Crawford and Alchian
(1978) or Williamson (1985).
9
  “Strictly complementary” is defined as the situation in which asset A yields no return in the absence of
asset B and vice versa.  In the literature, complementary assets are always tacitly seen as being specific
too, although this clearly need not be the case.  As Loasby (1995a) points out, there is also no recognition
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surplus, and on who is most responsive to incentives, since ownership by one of the parties
will attenuate the incentives of the other party.   The bottomline is that the efficient
ownership arrangements primarily turns on the trade-off between incentives for the buyer and
the seller.
In sum, the incomplete contract literature tells a precise (if static and rather ad hoc) story
about the boundaries of the firm, something no previous theorizing of the firm arguably has
been capable of doing in a convincing way (Langlois and Foss 1997).  It does so by equating
ownership of assets with the boundaries of the firm.  The theory is more than just a story of
asset ownership, however, for the employment relationship, and the distribution of bargaining
power associated with this relation, becomes a matter of who owns assets (the boss) and
who does not (the employee).  This reasoning is now rather widely regarded as the best
mainstream bid for a theory of the firm, and may perhaps win Professor Hart a Nobel Prize.10
However, as is also partly recognized within the mainstream, the theory is certainly not
completely unproblematic (Tirole 1994; Kreps 1996; Tirole and Maskin 1996).  I briefly
consider some of these problems in the following section.
B. Problems in Incomplete Contracts Theory: Preserving Closure
The incomplete contracts theory has given rise to some debate within the mainstream.  For
example, it has been argued that property rights are not always necessary for reaching
efficient outcomes, but that various cleverly designed rules for sharing the joint surplus can
under certain conditions substitute for property rights, so that we come back to the principal-
agent tradition (see the discussions in Tirole 1994; Maskin and Tirole 1996) (I return to this).
Relatedly, there has been some uneasiness about the supposedly less rigorous and more ad
hoc type of modeling that characterizes the incomplete contracts literature relative to the
principal-agent literature.
                                                                                                                                               
in the literature that strongly complementary assets may be dis-similar, and that their management may
therefore best be undertaken by separate firms.
10
  Indeed, among high-brow mainstream economists, Williamson’s work is now regarded as little more than
precursor of the Hart-Grossman-Moore analysis, handicapped by its neologisms and verbal style of
discource, rather than the basic work upon which much of the modern, formal analysis really rests. See
Kreps (1996) for an attempt to show how relatively little of Williamson’s rich analysis has been captured
by the incomplete contracts literature.
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Indeed, it certainly is easy to make sport of much of the incomplete contracts literature in this
regard.  If the evolution of mainstream economics really is a story of the gradual and
successful banishment of “free parameters” and all sorts of ad hoc assumptions, as we are
sometimes told, then to what stage of evolution does the incomplete contract literature
belong? The motivation of such questions is that the literature would seem to be rich in
rather specific and not completely warranted assumptions on which the conclusions are
completely dependent, such as the prohibition of ex ante contracting over investment levels.
Most importantly, in the context of a paper written in honor of Brian Loasby, the treatment
in the literature of incompleteness and bounded rationality strikes one as odd but perhaps not
surprising (see also Radner 1996).  As has been noted by a contributor to the literature,
existing models “... have introduced incompleteness rather through the backdoor, by
assuming that certain things are not observable or verifiable or both” (Moore 1992, p.180).
Now, this has certain advantages from a modeling point of view, but may not capture the
essence of the matter, because the fundamental reason for contractual incompleteness may
indeed be bounded rationality in the sense of being unable to foresee future events.
However, if this is really the case, “... then our standard notions of hold-up may be suspect.
If parties cannot foresee certain events, let alone anticipate how surplus would be divided in
the event of renegotiation, then how is this likely to affect the size and nature of their specific
investments?” (ibid).  Of course, there is the possibility of relying more explicitly on
reputation mechanisms in order to reduce the foreseeability-problem, but this is not a route
that the literature seems intent on taking (but see Kreps 1996).
In a related context Loasby (1995a) points out that including bounded rationality, and
perhaps genuine uncertainty, clearly also complicates efficiency analysis of alternative
governance structures.11 Thus, “... the recognition of ignorance changes the logic of choice”
(Loasby 1976, p.74).  It may bring us into evolutionary modes of thinking (Dow 1987; Kreps
1996) and a completely different view of agency and of modeling.
It may install a proper place for bounded rationality, for true ignorance, for Shacklean
surprises (Earl 1996), and it may, notably, give more room for transaction costs (which only
enter in the guise of the inability to write complete contracts).
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  For a related discussion in the context of Williamson’s transaction cost economics, see Dow (1987).
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Needless to say, there have been different ways to try to eliminate the problem that Moore
identifies in the quotations above, and so avoid being drawn into (what mainstream theorists
see as) a quagmire of indeterminacy (Radner 1996).  For example, Hart (1990, p.699) argues
that a solution to the problem is when “... the parties can conceive of the various
contingencies and dimensions of an action, but cannot write them down in a clear enough
way that an outside arbiter, such as a court can verify them”.  This really amounts to
reducing bounded rationality to a private information issue.12  That such a solution must be
preferred stems from the fact that for the reasoning of the incomplete contract literature, “...
it is actually very important that agents have a high degree of computational ability” (ibid.),
quite in contrast to the basic message of Herbert Simon’s writings.  Thus, even though
parties to a contract cannot write a contract that avoids hold-up problems, that is, cannot
write down date 0 contingent statements, they have perfect foresight about the consequences
of their inability to do this (on this, see also Dow 1987 and Kreps 1992).  Indeed, Maskin
and Tirole (1996) argue that the transaction costs of describing or foreseeing in advance
possible states of nature does not necessarily compromise optimal contracting, provided
agents can probabilistically forecast their possible future pay-offs (even if other aspects
cannot be foreseen), that is, agents can perform dynamic programming.  They provocatively
call this “the irrelevance theorem”, and what is irrelevant, of course, are transaction costs.
Whether it makes any sense at all sense to assume that parties to a contract can correctly
anticipate the distribution of utility, but cannot describe the sources of that utility is an
interesting question, but not one that will occupy me further.  I shall end this section by
noting that having tried to find theoretical room for the firm, mainstream theorists have to
their horror discovered that this seem to bring them directly into the realms of ignorance,
surprise, and genuine uncertainty.   At least two strategies are possible in this situation: to
suppress these disturbing factors, and thus preserve neoclassical closure, or to try tackle
them head on and make them an integral part of the theory of the firm (see Earl 1996).  So
far, mainstream economists have preferred the first option.  In the next section, I consider the
work of an economist, whose work on the firm has from the beginning placed ignorance,
surprise, and genuine uncertainty centrally in the analysis of economic organization.
                                               
12
 And as Hart notes: “The conclusion I draw from this discussion is that bounded rationality in the   classic
Simon (1957) sense is not essential for a theory of organizations” (1990, p.699).
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III.  Organizing Knowledge:
Brian Loasby on Firms and Incomplete Contracts
A.  Overall
At the face of it, Loasby’s work on the firm would seem to begin from a recognition that is
very similar to that of incomplete contract theorists:
“The firm exists because it is impossible to specify all actions, even contingent
actions in advance; it embodies a very different policy to emergent events.
Incomplete specification is its essential basis: for complete specification can be
handled by the market” (Loasby 1976, p.134).
It is not difficult to understand why contractual incompleteness should be an often recurring
theme in Loasby’s work: combine his early interest in organizations and organization theory
with the basic ideas of three of his patron saints, namely Ronald Coase, George Shackle and
Friedrich Hayek, and an interest in contractual incompleteness would seem to follow almost
naturally.  Let me explain.
Coase, of course, is the first economist at all to make a point out of contractual
incompleteness (not even Knight had done this); Shackle was the prophet of the unexpected,
and the unexpected and  contractual incompleteness are closely related phenomena; and, at
least as Loasby interprets Hayek’s work, the latter’s main interest was in understanding how
a market system adapts to unexpected change.  Following Hayek and other Austro-
evolutionary writers, Loasby has consistently maintained that the economic problem is
essentially one of how to best adapt to Shacklean surprises, which, to a large extent, is a
matter of institutions, including  contracts.  This theme has recently become prominent in
Oliver Williamson’s thinking (Williamson 1996), but only in the context of the focus on
incentive conflicts characteristic of most of the post-Coase literature on economic
organization.
In contrast, Loasby has entertained a distinctly non-orthodox perspective on contractual
incompleteness, which is seen as important, not because it provides leeway for opportunism,
but because it is a part of the enabling structures of firms that permit the building-up of new
capabilities. Indeed, one may here say that Loasby has done much more than merely
18
emphasizing the importance of contractual incompleteness.  He has combined the insights of
the above three economists with the ideas and insights of four of his other patron saints,
namely Marshall (economic evolution as a process of increasing differentiation and
organization of this), Menger (unintended consequences, reserves), Penrose (learning
processes, capabilities) and Richardson (the organization of capabilities), to arrive at a rich
theory of economic organization that begins “... not with the Walrasian problem of efficient
allocation among people ... but with the problem of knowledge” (Loasby 1995a, p.482).    I
present and discuss the overall aspects of this view in the rest of this section.
B. “Choice, Complexity and Ignorance”: Incomplete Contracts and
Organizational Structure and Learning
The first full statements in Loasby’s work of the issues under consideration here can be found
in CCI.  That book roams very wide indeed, but there are certainly connecting principles in it.
Most fundamentally, it is a book about organizing knowledge; about how economic agents
organize their knowledge, and about how economists organize their knowledge about the
knowledge-organizing activities of economic agents. Its fundamental premise, I would argue,
is that “... the recognition of ignorance changes the logic of choice” (p.74).  This premise
would seem to be founded on the basic Popperianism that is present in CCI, and which
Loasby has never left.  Fundamentally, if all knowledge is conjectural and all data are theory-
laden, including the knowledge and data of economic agents, surprises may take place,
learning will be of the trial-and-error variety (rather than  Bayesian updating of priors),
interpretive frameworks will matter, reserves will have a function, etc.  Thus, the recognition
of ignorance opens the door to alternative conceptualizations of behavior on the individual
level.  Moreover,  it provides a room for institutions and phenomena that have traditionally
been hard to press into a general equilibrium mold, notably money, learning − and the firm.
As argued in the previous section, although modern formal organizational economics theories
are partial equilibrium theories, they have a foundation in general equilibrium theory, both
historically and conceptually (Hart and Holmström 1987; Guesnerie 1994). There are at least
three different ways of modifying the basic competitive model, so that we can explain aspects
of economic organization. These are increasingly radical, brings the model increasingly close
to reality, and increasingly sacrifices formal rigor.
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The first is to introduce asymmetric information,  and focus, for example, on the costs of
aligning objectives among a principal and an agent.  The relevant costs here are merely costs
of observing post-contractual performance.  As we saw in the previous section, the highly
formal literature that has been constructed around this basic idea is somewhat limited; for one
thing, it cannot explain the existence of the firm, since it fails to discriminate among
alternative ownership forms.
The second procedure is to introduce bounded rationality; people simply do not have the wits
to imagine and make provisions for all relevant future contingencies.  In terms of costs,
bounded rationality considerations point to the costs of drafting contracts: because the costs
of imagining all possible relevant contingencies, making provisions for these, putting them
down on paper in a clear language, etc. are prohibitive, many contracts are necessarily left
incomplete.  As we saw in the preceding section, the implications of this are quite far-
reaching; among other things, we become able to tell a convincing story − via the concepts of
residual rights and ownership − of the boundaries of the firm.  We also saw, however, that
this more realistic route to a theory of economic organization sacrifices some formal rigor.
The third possibility, which may seem quite related in its implications to the second, is to “...
recognize the pervasiveness of uncertainty, not just in the form of unknown probability
distributions, but in the sense of Frank Knight (1921) and George Shackle (1972), of
uncompleteable lists of contingencies, and indeed of doubts about the structure of many
decision-situations” (Loasby 1994, p.6).  Although the recognition of “the pervasiveness of
uncertainty” may seem to have the same implications for contracts as the recognition of
bounded rationality, namely that many contracts are left incomplete, there is a difference.
For to Loasby, “the recognition of ignorance changes the logic of choice” in a way more
profound than does the recognition of bounded rationality.
In most versions of the idea of bounded rationality problem situations are given, and the only
way in which the standard decision theoretic set-up has been changed is through the
recognition of limited computational power on the part of decision makers (Radner 1996).
To Loasby, recognizing the existence of ignorance means that problems are not pre-defined,
that means-ends structures have to be set up by decision makers; indeed, that the essence of
decision-making lies in making sense of the environment, defining which problems should be
20
solved, how and when, etc. (Dosi and Marengo 1994).  It is this radical possibility that
Loasby uses.  As he explains
“Starting from a basis of general equilibrium theory, we have argued that the firm
offers a possible substitute for the market system when the information required
for the working of that system is costly to acquire and use.  The argument
becomes even stronger when we recognize that some of the information cannot
exist. Whether it is a viable substitute depends upon the costs and quality of
decision-making within the firm, including its ability to select the more important
interdependencies. Its basic methods of operation must be different from those of
the market.  It must recognize and define those problems with which it proposes
to deal, and it must attempt to learn as it goes along, not only what are the
relevant data, but what are the rules of the game” (p.78; my emphasis).13
As Loasby clarifies in later work (although the embryo of the idea is certainly present in the
1976 book), the problems that firms “define” may be seen as being framed by the paradigm
of the firm (Loasby 1983, 1986).  Here Loasby draws on the work of Thomas Kuhn for
constructing a sophisticated constructivist perspective on the firm that is more related to
work of, say, organization theorist Karl Weick (1995) than to what almost any other
economist has written on the subject of the firm.14  Indeed, one of the fascinating aspects of
CCI lies in its attempt to combine key idea from organization theory with key ideas in the
theory of the firm.  Here, too, Loasby has been a pioneer, for (excepting Williamson’s work)
it is only very recently that economists have seen a need to relate to the work that
organization theorists have been doing for many years.  The organization theory theme is
directly related to the incomplete contracts theme:
“The imperfectly-specified contract which characterizes the firm implies an
imperfectly-specified structure, the central concern and dilemma of organisation
theory” (p.135),
                                               
13
 That the firm is, among other things, a cognitive entity, has become an important theme in contemporary
evolutionary economics (e.g., Dosi and Marengo 1994) and  organizational learning theory (Cohen and
Sproull 1996).   Here, too, “... the question of how problems are defined becomes a key question in the
analysis of firms” (Loasby 1976, p.88).
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and we are told that Cyert and March (1963) “... extend Coase’s notion of the firm as a set of
imperfectly specified contracts by viewing it as a coalition on imperfectly-specified terms”
(p.140). Unfortunately, Loasby’s interest in organization theory seems to have diminished
somewhat, and his works are no longer littered with references to Simon and March, Cyert
and March, etc.  Instead, he has increasingly turned his interest to an area that arguably lies
closer to the interests of the modern strategy scholar than to that of the organization scholar,
namely capabilities.
C. Later Developments: Capabilities, Learning, and Reserves
When writing CCI, Loasby did not make much use of the concept of capabilities although it
had been applied in the context of the theory of economic organization by G.B. Richardson
(1972) a few years earlier in a paper that is cited in the book. Relatedly, Penrose’s work −
surely the single most important precursor of the capabilities perspective − is not centrally
placed at all in CCI.  However, Loasby has made good use of the concept later on, not to
speak of Penrose’s work, and is indeed today one of the key contributors to the emerging
capabilities perspective.
Like Loasby did in CCI,  contributors to the capabilities perspective emphasize that firms are
cognitive entities, but they develop this conceptualization in rather different ways.  Thus, some
begin from bounded rationality and other aspects of cognition and build up a theory of firm-
specific knowledge − that is, capabilities  (e.g., Kogut and Zander 1992; Dosi and Marengo
1994).  Other contributions simply begin from the empirical generalization that in general
productive knowledge is neither explicit nor freely transferable (e.g., Langlois, 1992; Foss,
1993; Langlois and Foss, 1996), without going into the reasons for this in detail.
In what is arguably still a key contribution to the capabilities perspective, and one that has
very often been cited by Loasby,  Nelson and Winter (1982: chapter 4 & 5) choose the former
strategy: they explicitly begin with an analysis of individual skills and builds up from this analysis
to an analysis of firm-specific intangible assets what they call “routines”.  The acquisition of skills
is a matter of learning by doing and the accumulation of tacit knowledge through the experience
                                                                                                                                               
14
  Penrose’s use of Boulding’s concept of “the image”, and her concept of the firm’s “productive opportunity
set”, which comprises all of the productive opportunities that the firm’s entrepreneurial team can see and
believe they can take advantage of, are, however, rather closely related concepts.
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of particulars.  It therefore opens the door for specialization, routinization, and predictability;
however, the other side of the coin is increased inflexibility.  This analysis − drawn from the
behavioralist theory of the firm (Cyert and March, 1963) and the work of Michael Polanyi (1958)
− is then used as both as a convenient analogy and a micro-foundation for elaborating the idea of
organizational knowledge.  As Nelson and Winter say, “Routines are the skills of an
organization”.   More precisely, routines are shared rules of conduct that produce sequences of
collective actions over time.  Such routines codify organizational and productive knowledge, and
are maintained and augmented through application in productive tasks.  Like skills, they are partly
tacit and imply a certain measure of inflexibility.   Thus, firms are repositories of partly tacit and
socially produced and reproduced organisation and production knowledge, a basic
conceptualization of the firm that is also the one adopted in Loasby’s recent work, although with
some interesting twists.
Because of the role of chance, history and lock-in to specific learning domains in the process of
knowledge-building, firms’ knowledge-bases are strongly path-dependent and different across the
population of firms.  Different knowledge-bases are associated with different efficiencies, and
therefore yield differential rents when deployed to product markets.  Thus, the capabilities
perspective forms the basis of theory of firm strategy.15 However, although the perspective
certainly helps us understanding the sources of competitive advantage and persistent
heterogeneity, it may be criticized for saying relatively little about the process of building new
capabilities.  Similarly, it is somewhat unclear how this emerging literature relates to the modern
economics of organization (including the incomplete contracts view) (see the discussion in
Langlois and Foss 1997 and Foss 1997c).
Much of Loasby’s recent work may in fact be seen as addressing both of these two weaknesses in
the capabilities perspective, and addressing them, in fact, in a unified way.  Following his basic
Popperian approach to knowledge and learning, capabilities are seen as what we may call
“collective (but firm-specific) conjectures”, and as developing and changing in a Popperian way
through tests in the market place (although this is of course is subject to the usual Duhem-Quine
problem) (Loasby 1995b).  Now, capabilities also have the characteristic that they give the firm
                                               
15
  See the contributions reprinted in Foss (1997).
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the power to act effectively in a range of possible futures16; they embody some measure of
flexibility, because they are what Loasby (1991), with a bow to Carl Menger’s analysis of
liquidity, calls “reserves”.
Thus, while Loasby has not changed his fundamental view of incomplete contracts as institutions
that support flexibility  − a view first set out in CCI − he has now more explicitly tied this view to
considerations of organizational flexibility and learning.  A paraphrase of his view may be the
following: Because firms are actors in a kaleidic world (Earl 1996), they often need to reshuffle
existing capabilities (use their capabilities-as-reserves) and grow new ones.  Incomplete contracts,
in this view, is part of the organizational structure that allows the flexible carrying out of these
processes.17 Markets lack the directedness/intentionality that characterize firms, so firms have an
advantage in many instances of qualitative coordination (coordination that goes beyond price),
particularly when the activities to be coordinated are closely complementary (Richardson 1972).
Moreover, firms can combine directedness with the flexibility afforded by incomplete contracts.
There are difficulties with this view which are not completely resolved in Loasby’s writings; for
example, markets can often grow and structure capabilities as well as firms can − so when will
markets carry out this task and when will firms?  This, however, has been addressed by, for
example, the Loasby-inspired work of Richard Langlois (e.g., 1998) and Langlois and Paul
Robertson (1995), where a main point is that vertically integrated, entrepreneurial firms will tend
to organize the process of structuring of capabilities when economic change is “radical” and in a
sense unfamiliar to the economic system.  As this suggests, it is possible and fruitful to build on
Loasby’s overall vision of the firm in a market economy.  In the next section, I suggest a few
other ways in which this vision may be furthered.
                                               
16
  At least this goes for what is often called “dynamic capabilities”, which are the capabilities to introduce
innovations and to effectively adapt to changed circumstances in the market. See Teece, Pisano and Shuen
(1997).
17
  For elaboration on this, see Foss (1997b).
24
IV.  Discussion: Toward a Loasbian Theory of the Firm
A. Loasby’ View vs The Modern View on Incomplete Contracts
In spite of huge differences, incomplete contract theorists and Brian Loasby begin from the
same starting point: The recognition that contractual incompleteness is a necessary condition
for explaining the existence and boundaries of the firm.  But they treat both the causes and
the consequences of contractual incompleteness differently: while to incomplete contract
theorists, incompleteness is tied to incentive conflicts, to Loasby it provides room for
organizational learning; to the former, the firm is an efficient allocation of property rights to
capital assets, to Loasby the firm is first and foremost a cognitive, learning entity.   Indeed,
he tends to oppose the two views; “a firm”, he says, “... is a social institution for enhancing
capabilities rather than reducing transaction costs” (1995b, p.20).
While I personally have doubts about the meaningfulness of opposing the two views of the
firm, it may pay off as a research strategy to suppress all incentive conflicts and focus only on
pure coordination issues (cf. also Bolton and Dewatripont 1994; Radner 1996).  I take this to
be the research strategy favored by Loasby (for further evidence, see Loasby 1995a).
Accordingly, in the following pages such conflicts are suppressed, for example, by appeal to
reputation or supergame arguments (Kreps 1996).  Given this, we may produce a short-list
of points that a Loasbian approach to the firm should incorporate.  Thus, the theory should
• be dynamic in the sense that flexibility and learning are treated (whereas both 
are neglected in the mainstream theory of the firm);
• make contact to the literature on firm capabilities (which is not done in the mainstream
literature);
• put emphasis on flexibility and knowledge-accumulation as parts of the rationales of
firms (contra the mainstream literature); and
• not make use of concepts such as “opportunism”, “moral hazard” and the like 
(again contra the mainstream literature).
In the following, I shall  briefly and tentatively suggest that we do have some basic tools and
insights that may help us build a theory of the firm that meets these desiderata; tools and
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insights that do not turn on incentive conflicts, opportunism, and which may be used to
develop a perspective on economic organization that is more true to Loasby’s emphasis on
flexibility and learning in an uncertain world than the incentive-conflict perspective is.
Nevertheless, these are relatively mainstream tools and ideas, centering on game-theory and
real options.  While the following is low-brow theory (rather, loose suggestions), it may be
read as a call for high- (or middle-) brow theorists to turn their symbol-manipulating skills to
Loasbian ideas.
B. Loasby’s View on Economic Organization  I:
Adaptation and Communication in Alternative Game-Forms
While Loasby’s view of incomplete contracts and the firm is far away from the
contemporary, dominant view, it does link up with an older tradition, begun by Ronald Coase
(1937) and represented in the work of, for example, Simon (1951) and Malmgren (1961)
(Foss 1996b; Langlois 1998).  Here the firm is defined by the employment relationship and
firms’ primary raison d'etre lies in their superior adaptability and coordinative ability (for some
productive tasks), where this is rationalized by pointing to the presence of hierarchical direction in
the context of open-ended employment contracts.  In this tradition it is the more basic
coordination problem of making activities, individual efforts, learning processes, strategies, etc.
mesh (particularly under the impact of various disturbances) that is highlighted, rather than the
logically secondary problem of, for example, controlling and influencing the level of efforts (as in
principal-agent theory) once everything is in place, as it were.  It is, in short, a coordination view
of the firm rather than an incentive-conflict view.18  And the underlying idea seems to be that
within the firm it is possible to generate more and, in some sense, richer coordinative activity than
can be obtained in markets, and that firms may indeed exist because of this coordination gain
(Malmgren 1961).  This view has not been extensively developed, particularly not by formal
theorists, perhaps because it does not appear to them to convincingly explain 1) why
authority in firms should be different from authority in markets (cf. Alchian and Demsetz
                                               
18
  For recent pertinent work from different perspectives, see Demsetz (1988), Langlois and Robertson
(1995), Radner (1996), Segal (1996), Casson (1997) and Wernerfelt (1997).
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1972), and 2) why firms should be able to obtain richer coordinative activity than can be
obtained in markets.
A possible clue, however, may lie in the fact that, as Loasby (1995c) points out, coordination
and communication are two closely related phenomena.  For example, in the context of a
productive task, only a subset of the agents involved in the task (e.g., the managers) may be
able to observe the changes in the state of the environment that influence the outcome of the
task.  Adapting the task will typically require communication.  In principle, this
communication may take place inside a firms as well as across the market interface, but the
conjecture is here − pace Grossman and Hart (1986) − that the size of communication costs
may influence the choice of governance structure.19
Accordingly, a pertinent place to begin the search for non-incentive-conflict determinants of
economic organization may be with work on communication and communication costs.  With
the exception of Leonid Hurwicz’ (1972) work on decentralization and work on teams (e.g.,
Radner 1995; Bolton and Dewatripont 1994), this has not been given much attention in
mainstream economics.  However, Hurwicz suggested that we on look on different types of
economic organization as different gameforms, characterized by different communication
requirements.  This may actually be a quite fertile idea, not just on the societal level which
Hurwicz was interested in, but also with respect to the firm/market choice (cf. Kreps 1996;
Wernerfelt 1997).
As a starting point, we may think generally of governance mechanisms (here restricted to
only firms and markets) as gameforms in which players adapt to changes in the environment
(the latter term being interpreted broadly) (Williamson 1996) and communicate about these
changes (Wernerfelt 1997). In general, adaptations have to do with reacting to new learning
and unexpected opportunities.  This includes both changes that are ”outside” the gameform
(husband receiving call on the market from housewife), and changes that are “inside” it, such
as learning that is directly stimulated by interaction between employees and employers (the
hierarchy gameform).
                                               
19
  In a similar vein, Demsetz (1988) suggests that direction of the less knowledgeable by the more
knowledgeable may constitute an independent rationale for the firm. And Segal (1996) argues that an
understanding of the nature of the managerial task necessitates that attention be paid to communication
costs.
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The conjecture here is that different gameforms will be systematically characterized by
different levels of (fixed and variable) costs of making adaptations (cf. Wernerfelt 1997).  For
example, a player goes to the local market, bargains for various goods, and while he is there,
his wife unexpectedly calls him on the cellular phone and asks him to buy more groceries
than are on the shopping list.  In this case, the price of each adaptation will be an outcome of
the haggling process associated with each good that the player buys.
The opposite extreme, of course, is the gameform known as the hiearchy in which the
employer and the employee avoid “... the costs of negotiating either an extremely complex
agreement or a series of short term contracts” (Loasby 1994b, p.252).   Instead, the parties
negotiate a once-and-for-all wage contract.  In this context, authority is simply a voluntary
agreement that one of the parties should tell the other what to do (as in Coase 1937 and
Simon 1951), probably sustained by some sort of implicit contract (Kreps 1996).20
Obviously, this gameform requires the least bargaining over prices of the two gameforms
considered and also has the lowest variable costs of adaptation, but is characterized by high
fixed costs (because of the fixed wage).  In the case of the market gameform, the
variable/fixed cost proportion is the inverse.  In other words, when choosing gameforms for
regulating their trade, players confront a trade-off between fixed and variable costs of
communicating/adapting.
What can we say about which sort of transactions will be governed by these two gameforms?
First, high frequency transactions would seem to be biased towards the hierarchy gameform.
But frequency alone will not suffice as a characterization of hierarchical transactions (many
market transactions are high frequency); something else is needed. This is where the
capabilities considerations that have been so prominent in Loasby’s writings over the years
may enter the scene.
To many writers on capabilities, as we have seen, the import of the concept of capabilities
clearly lies in their limitations.  Because of what are essentially cognitive limitations, firms
must specialize.  To Richardson (1972), for example, firms will tend to bring activities that
are “similar” in-house and avoid integrating “dis-similar” ones, even if they are “closely
                                               
20
  This simple understanding of hieararchy does away with the Alchian and Demsetz (1972) critique.
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complementary”21, and Coase (1937) much earlier had hinted that an important factor
limiting the size of firms was “the dissimilarity of transactions”.  As a follower of both Coase
and Richardson put it:
“The more heterogenous the transactions assimilated by the firm, the greater the
cost. Although economic interdependence, direct or indirect, is universal, that
interdependence varies in kind and degree throughout the system. Where the
linkage between activities begin to thin out and transactions become more
heterogenous, the cost of assimilating such transactions begin at some point to
exceed the gain to be had” (Malmgren 1961, p. 420).
It is not entirely clear what is meant here by transactions being “heterogenous”, but one
obvious interpretation, and the one that is adopted here, is that transactions are
heterogeneous when they are somehow linked to heterogenous activities and underlying
heterogeneous capabilities (Richardson 1972).
The emphasis on heterogeneity and interdependence provides a link to the earlier discussion
about communication in alternative gameforms.  For one understanding of heterogeneity of
transactions (activities, capabilities), and of heterogeneity as a determinant of specialization,
surely has to do with communication costs.  Heterogeneous transactions may be
heterogeneous precisely because (or, in the sense that) communicating about them is costly.
For example, firms avoid bringing entirely dissimilar transactions (activities, capabilities) in-
house because this implies that they incur substantial communication costs when trying to
coordinate these activities under the impact of changes in the environment.
The other side of the coin is that firms (the hierarchical gameform) may have coordinative
advantages relative to the market gameform for certain classes of transactions, namely those
that are similar to what the firm is already doing, because communication costs in the firm
may be smaller than in the market for these transactions.  The relative reduction in
communication costs is brought about by the continuity of association among input owners
that characterizes the hierarchical gameform and which supports the development of a
“shared context” (Ghoshal et al. 1995), a shared “image” (Penrose 1959), “convergent
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 These will be handled through inter-firm relations.
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expectations” (Malmgren 1961), a “paradigm” (Loasby 1986), a “corporate culture”, or
whatever we decide to call what is essentially the same thing.
There are two main messages of this extremely sketchy analysis.  The first is the substantive
one that economic organization, including the existence and boundaries of the firm, may
(partly) reflect economizing on communication costs, not only because there is a link
between frequency and communication costs, but also because the heterogeneity of
transactions may influence communication costs.  While it is relatively easy to think of and
model frequency, heterogeneity of transactions may be more tricky.  One suggestion could be
to think of a distribution of some relevant knowledge-based characteristic of transactions, the
variance of that distribution being one determinant communication costs.  This leads into the
other message, namely modelling issues.  The conjecture here is that rather elementary ideas
on communication costs, alternative gameforms, etc. may be used to formally address
Loasby’s non-orthodox ideas on the firm.  The next section also pursues this theme, but in a
different context and with less of an emphasis on imcomplete contracts.
C. Loasby’s View on Economic Organization  II: Real Options
Already in CCI (1976, p.65), Loasby suggests that the firm should be considered, like
money, as a substitute for a group of contingent claims markets, and as we have seen he has
now come to view the firm as set of reserves (Loasby 1991b, 1994a&b).  But as he also
argues, markets may seen in much the same way:
“Both firms and markets are devices for creating and preserving the possibility of
future transactions; they are intangible and complex capital assets which are
valuable precisely because the future is not predictable enough to justify present
commitments” (1994b, p.8),
and
“The firm is a response to structural uncertainty. If there are no adequate markets
for contingent commodities because no-one knows how to specify the appropriate
contingency sets, then the remedy is to create option sets in the firm of reserves”
(1994a, p. 252-253).
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In this view of institutions-as-reserves, what would primarily seem to distinguish firms and
markets is that whereas ongoing markets are undesigned institutions that embody options for
future contracts, ongoing firms are designed institutions that embody contracts for future
options.  In the case of markets, competition and exit possibilities preserve flexibility; in the
case of firms, incomplete contracts assist flexibility.
The notion that firms should have some flexibility to respond to future uncertainties has
much intuitive appeal, but until recently it has been hard to conceptualize in economic terms.
However, the inclusion of ideas about the valuation of financial options into the context of
valuing non-financial investment projects may be helpful here (Sanchez 1993; Dixit and
Pindyck 1994).  I therefore here suggest that one possible understanding of Loasby’s ideas
on institutions-as-reserves is to say that both firms and markets have option value,  in the
sense of, for example, Dixit and Pindyck (1994).  In other words, firms and markets may
(also) be seen as portfolios of real options.  I here concentrate on the conceptualization of
the firm as a portfolio of real options, and briefly describe some consequences of this view
for the theory of economic organization.
With respect to the flexibility issue, firms may be flexible in terms of, for example, which
products they wish to produce, when they will produce (and develop and market) these
products, and how the production (and sale and marketing and development) of the products
should be organized.  Because an option is a right to choose whether or not to take an action
now or at some future time, this means that we can speak, referring to these three sets of
choices, of product options, timing options, and implementation options (in the terminology
of Sanchez 1993).  For example, what Penrose (1959) calls the firm’s “productive
opportunity set” − which encompasses all of the opportunities that the firm’s management
can see and can (but doesn’t have to) take advantage of − clearly constitutes a set of real
product options.  In principle, these real options can be valued, using the same tools that
have been developed in the context of financial options.
The advantages of this overall view is that it gives some discipline to loose notions of
flexibility, particularly in the context of the firm strategy field.  Thus, an options perspective
indicates, for example, that optimal flexibility is not maximum flexibility, since the costs of
acquiring “maximum” flexibility are unlimited.  Optimal flexibility corresponds to the plan of
action that enables the firm to acquire the set of options that maximizes the net present value
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of the firm.  The contention here is that the options view not only has implications for firm
strategy, but also has implications for the theory of economic organization, as indicated, but
not spelled out by Loasby.  For example, an options view on economic organization  better
helps us, I suggest, to recognize the benefit aspects of firms, hybrids and markets, something
that may sometimes have been neglected in some quarters of the contractual approach to
firm, because of its near exclusive concern with transaction costs.
A possible starting point is supplied by Loasby’s suggestion that we should look upon
ongoing (and well-developed) markets as embodying options for future contracts.
Moreover, we should also remember his point that “Firms and markets are clearly partial
substitutes; but it is no less important to recognize that they are also complements” (Loasby
1994a, p.8).  Translated into the terminology used here, an ongoing, well-developed market
provide options to wait and options to abandon to firms: they allow firms to defer the
acquisition of inputs and make it contingent on an actual, future need, and they allow firms to
get rid of unconsumed inputs (Sanchez 1993, p.272).  The capability to use markets
intelligently in this way may be an important source of competitive success, as the work of
Casson (1997) indicates, and as the cases of NIKE and IKEA confirm.
Likewise, participating in networks and other sorts of interfirm arrangements may increase
the number of real options available to firms, for example, by providing better access to other
firms’ capabilities (thus allowing the firm to extend its technological capabilities and generate
more product options), to “thin” input markets, and to “the collective capabilities of the
participants” (Loasby 1994b, p.263).  In other words, networks may provide options (of both
the timing and the product diversity) that are not easily obtained in more “normal” markets.
“The consequence” of such networks, says Loasby (ibid.), “is a pool of resources,
constituting a greater variety of reserves than can be accommodated within the necessary
constraints of a single firm”.
The other side of the coin thus is that internalization forfeits the option to wait to acquire
inputs; it cuts off the firm from a contingent deferral of the commitment to incur the cost of
inputs.  From this perspective, firms should internalize only a few inputs that are
exceptionally difficult to obtain through markets or networks and are capable of generating
superior options values for the firm.  Capabilities would often seem to have precisely these
32
characteristics.  Some consequences for economic organization, telegraphically stated, of the
options perspective are:
• In an real options/flexibility perspective, optimal economic organization/the efficient
boundaries of the firm maximizes the options value of the firm.  This is considerably
broader (but may incorporate) the idea that optimal economic organization minimizes
transaction costs.
• From the perspective of the firm, the efficient proportion between market and hierarchy
depends on “a vision of possible futures” (Loasby 1994, p.253), including a vision of
which products the firm can produce in the future, which inputs are necessary for
producing these products, and an estimate of whether input markets can be expected to
be well-behaved or not (Sanchez 1993, p.276).
V.  Conclusion
My aim in this paper has been to discuss Brian Loasby’s work on incomplete contracts as
they relate to the theory of the firm, to contrast this view with the modern mainstream view,
and to finally suggest that we may use some basic ideas and insights in game theory and real
options theory to put some conceptual meat on Loasby’s non-orthodox ideas.  This latter
suggestion, however, has been far from fully developed here; I have rested content with
providing simple sketches.
The overall message is that with respect to the theory of the firm, at least, there should be
room for some potentially dialogue between open-minded mainstream theorists and open-
minded heterodox economists. Loasby’s view of firms and incomplete contracts is very
different from that of mainstream contractual theorists, and we have seen that the latter have
valiantly tried to avoid being drawn into the difficulties (and challenges) that bounded
rationality, genuine uncertainty and ignorance creates for the analysis of economic
organization. However, there is increasing recognition among some mainstream researchers
that Loasbian issues, such as flexibility and learning, may be important determinants of the
choice of institutional forms (e.g., Bolton and Dewatripoint 1994; Wernerfelt 1997).  Let me
end by quoting, as support of this view, two of the leaders of formal mainstream work on
organizations:
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 “The incentive based transaction costs theory has been made to carry too much of
the weight of explanation in the theory of organizations.  We expect competing
and complementary theories to emerge − theories that are founded on
economizing on bounded rationality and that pay more attention to changing
technology and to evolutionary considerations (Milgrom and Roberts 1988,
p.450).
Surely, Brian Loasby’s work on the theory of the firm may be an important source of
inspiration for the emerging “competing and complementary theories ... founded on ...
bounded rationality ... and ... evolutionary considerations”.
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The Research Programme
The DRUID-research programme is organised in 3 different research themes :
- The firm as a learning organisation
- Competence building and inter-firm dynamics
- The learning economy and the competitiveness of systems of innovation
In each of the three areas there is one strategic theoretical and one central empirical and
policy oriented orientation.
Theme A: The firm as a learning organisation  
The theoretical perspective confronts and combines the ressource-based view (Penrose,
1959) with recent approaches where the focus is on learning and the dynamic capabilities of
the firm (Dosi, Teece and Winter, 1992). The aim of this theoretical work is to develop an
analytical understanding of the firm as a learning organisation.
The empirical and policy issues relate to the nexus technology, productivity, organisational
change and human ressources. More insight in the dynamic interplay between these factors at
the level of the firm is crucial to understand international differences in performance at the
macro level in terms of economic growth and employment.
Theme B: Competence building and inter-firm dynamics
The theoretical perspective relates to the dynamics of the inter-firm division of labour and
the formation of network relationships between firms. An attempt will be made to develop
evolutionary models with Schumpeterian innovations as the motor driving a Marshallian
evolution of the division of labour.
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The empirical and policy issues relate the formation of knowledge-intensive regional and
sectoral networks of firms to competitiveness and structural change. Data on the structure of
production will be combined with indicators of knowledge and learning. IO-matrixes which
include flows of knowledge and new technologies will be developed and supplemented by
data from case-studies and questionnaires.
Theme C: The learning economy and the competitiveness of systems of innovation.
The third theme aims at a stronger conceptual and theoretical base for new concepts such as
'systems of innovation' and 'the learning economy' and to link these concepts to the
ecological dimension. The focus is on the interaction between institutional and technical
change in a specified geographical space. An attempt will be made to synthesise theories of
economic development emphasising  the role of science based-sectors  with those empha-
sising learning-by-producing and the growing knowledge-intensity of all economic activities.
The main empirical and policy issues are related to changes in the local dimensions of
innovation and learning. What remains of the relative autonomy of national systems of
innovation? Is there a tendency towards convergence  or divergence in the specialisation in
trade, production, innovation and in the knowledge base itself when we compare regions and
nations?
The Ph.D.-programme
There are at present more than 10 Ph.D.-students working in close connection to the
DRUID research programme. DRUID organises regularly specific Ph.D-activities such as
workshops, seminars and courses, often in a co-operation with other Danish or international
institutes. Also important is the role of DRUID as an environment which stimulates the
Ph.D.-students to become creative and effective. This involves several elements:
- access to the international network in the form of visiting fellows and visits at the   sister
institutions
- participation in research projects
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- access to supervision of theses
- access to databases
Each year DRUID welcomes a limited number of foreign Ph.D.-students who wants to work
on subjects and project close to the core of the DRUID-research programme.
External projects
DRUID-members are involved in projects with external support. One major project which
covers several of the elements of the research programme is DISKO; a comparative analysis
of the Danish Innovation System; and there are several projects involving international co-
operation within EU's 4th Framework Programme. DRUID is open to host other projects as
far as they fall within its research profile. Special attention is given to the communication of
research results from such projects to a wide set of social actors and policy makers.
44
45
DRUID Working Papers
96-1 Lundvall, Bengt-Åke: The Social Dimension of the Learning Economy.
(ISBN 87-7873-000-7)
96-2 Foss, Nicolai J.: Firms, Incomplete Contracts and Organizational Learning.
(ISBN 87-7873-001-5)
96-3 Dalum, Bent and Villumsen, Gert:Are OECD Export Specialisation Patterns
Sticky?’ Relations to the Convergence-Divergence Debate. (ISBN 87-7873-002-3)
96-4 Foss, Nicolai J: Austrian and Post-Marshallian Economics: The Bridging Work of
George Richardson. (ISBN 87-7873-003-1)
96-5 Andersen, Esben S., Jensen, Anne K., Madsen, Lars and Jørgensen, Martin:
The Nelson and Winter Models Revisited: Prototypes for Computer-Based
Reconstruction of Schumpeterian Competition. (ISBN 87-7873-005-8)
96-6 Maskell, Peter: Learning in the village economy of Denmark. The role of
institutions and policy in sustaining competitiveness. (ISBN 87-7873-006-6)
96-7 Foss, Nicolai J. & Christensen, Jens Frøslev: A Process Approach to Corporate
Coherence. (ISBN 87-7873-007-4)
96-8 Foss, Nicolai J.: Capabilities and the Theory of the Firm. (ISBN 87-7873-008-2)
96-9 Foss, Kirsten: A transaction cost perspective on the influence of standards on
product development: Examples from the fruit and vegetable market. (ISBN 87-
7873-009-0)
46
96-10 Richardson, George B.: Competition, Innovation and Increasing Returns. (ISBN
87-7873-010-4)
96-11 Maskell, Peter: Localised low-tech learning in the furniture industry.
(ISBN 87-7873-011-2)
96-12 Laursen, Keld: The Impact of Technological Opportunity on the Dynamics of
Trade Performance. (ISBN 87-7873-012-0)
96-13 Andersen, Esben S.: The Evolution of an Industrial Sector with a Varying Degree
of Roundaboutness of Production. (ISBN 87-7873-013-9)
96-14 Dalum, Bent, Laursen, Keld & Villumsen, Gert: The Long Term Development of
OECD Export Specialisation Patterns: De-specialisation and “Stickiness”. (ISBN 87-
7873-014-7)
96-15 Foss, Nicolai J.: Thorstein B. Veblen: Precursor of the Competence-Based
Approach to the Firm. (ISBN 87-7873-015-5)
96-16 Gjerding, Allan Næs: Organisational innovation in the Danish private business
sector. (ISBN 87-7873-016-3)
96-17 Lund, Reinhard & Gjerding, Allan Næs: The flexible company Innovation, work
organisation and human ressource management. (ISBN 87-7873-017-1)
97-1 Foss, Nicolai J.: The Resource-Based Perspective: An Assessment and Diagnosis of
Problems. (ISBN 87-7873-019-8)
97-2 Langlois, Richard N.  & Foss, Nicolai J.: Capabilities and Governance: the Rebirth
of Production in the Theory of Economic Organization. (ISBN 87-7873-020-1)
47
97-3 Ernst, Dieter: Partners for the China Circle? The Asian Production Networks of
Japanese Electronics Firms. (ISBN 87-7873-022-8)
97-4 Richardson, George B.: Economic Analysis, Public Policy and the Software
Industry. (ISBN 87-7873-023-6)
97-5 Borrus, Michael & Zysman, John: You Don’t Have to Be A Giant: How The
Changing Terms of Competition in Global Markets are Creating New Possibilities
For Danish Companies. (ISBN 87-7873-024-4)
97-6 Teubal, Morris.: Restructuring and Embeddedness of Business Enterprises- An
Industrial and Technological Policy Perspective to System of Innovation Transition.
(ISBN 87-7873-025-2)
97-7 Ernst, Dieter & Guerrieri, Paolo: International Production Networks and
Changing Trade Patterns in East Asia: The Case of the Electronics Industry. (ISBN
87-7873-026-0)
97-8 Lazaric, Nathalie & Marengo, Luigi: Towards a Characterisation of assets and
Knowledge Created in Technological Agreements: Some evidence from the
automobile-robotics sector. (ISBN 87-7873-027-9)
97-9 Ernst, Dieter.: High-Tech Competition Puzzles. How Globalization Affects Firm
Behavior and Market Structure in the Electronics Industry. (ISBN 87-7873-028-7)
97-10 Foss, Nicolai J.: Equilibrium vs Evolution in te Resource-Based Perspective: The
Conflicting Legacies of Demsetz and Penrose. (ISBN 87-7873-029-5)
97-11 Foss, Nicolai J.: Incomplete Contracts and Economic Organization: Brian Loasby
and the Theory of te Firm. (ISBN 87-7873-030-9)
48
Information for subscribers.
Subscription price  for 1997 is 600 DKR (about 20 papers). The rate for single issues is 40
DKR. It is possible to make a commitment  to an exchange of papers from related
departments or research teams. All correspondence concerning the DRUID Working Papers
should be send to:
Pernille Wittrup
 Fibigerstræde 4
 DK-9220 Aalborg OE
Tel. 45 96 35 82 65
Fax. 45 98 15 60 13
 E-mail: druid-wp@business.auc.dk
